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STOP THE BEACH
RENOURISHMENT
AND THE PROBLEM OF
JUDICIAL TAKINGS
ILYA SOMIN

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
1
Environmental Protection represents the Supreme Court’s first effort
to address the problem of judicial takings. The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment states that “private property” cannot be “taken
2
without just compensation.” Until Stop the Beach Renourishment,
however, the Court had never considered the question of whether an
action by the judicial branch of government can ever be a “taking”
requiring the payment of compensation.
Unfortunately, a divided Court failed to resolve the issue, which is
now left for future cases. A plurality opinion authored by Justice
Scalia ruled that judicial takings do indeed exist, but only four of the
3
eight justices joined it. Two Justices—Anthony Kennedy and Sonia
Sotomayor—signed on to a concurring opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy, which contended that the issue of judicial takings under the
Fifth Amendment should be left for future resolution and that judicial
actions similar to takings might instead be barred by the Due Process
4
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

*

Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful suggestions and
comments, I would like to thank the participants in the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and
Public Policy symposium on judicial takings, and the editors of this Journal. I would also like to
thank Eric Facer and Eva Choi for their valuable research assistance.
1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
4. Id. at 2613–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

DO NOT DELETE

92

6/21/2011 12:28:07 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 6:1

Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence arguing that the entire issue of
judicial takings should not have been addressed by the Court, which
instead should simply have ruled that there is no judicial taking in this
case regardless of whether judicial takings might ever occur
5
elsewhere. In sum, there is no majority for any position on the
question of whether judicial takings exist at all or, if so, what factors
determine whether a particular judicial action qualifies as a taking.
For this reason, the question of judicial takings still remains to be
addressed by future Supreme Court decisions.
This article argues that judicial takings do exist and are forbidden
by the Fifth Amendment. I also explain why this conclusion would not
require federal courts to take on any unusual administrative burdens.
I do not consider several other important issues raised by Stop the
Beach Renourishment, such as whether some judicial takings might
also violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
whether the Florida Supreme Court’s actions in Stop the Beach
Renourishment itself should be considered a taking requiring
compensation, or whether Justices Breyer and Kennedy were right to
suggest that the Court should have avoided addressing the issue of
whether judicial takings exist in this case.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the background of the case.
In Part III, I defend Justice Scalia’s conclusion that “the Takings
Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for
6
it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.” This
principle follows logically from both the text and the original meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. Various rationales for distinguishing judicial
takings from other takings do not overturn this simple, but sound,
conclusion.
Part IV addresses the claim that enforcing a takings doctrine
would lead federal courts into severe practical difficulties. A judicial
takings doctrine does not require legal principles significantly
different from or more complicated than other takings claims. Justice
Breyer and others are wrong to suggest that such a doctrine would
“invite a host of federal takings claims” that federal judges would be
7
unable to handle.

5. Id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
8

Under Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act (the Act), the
state government is required to establish “renourishment” projects to
9
restore waterfront land that has become “critically eroded.” Once the
projects are complete, the Act gives the state title to any newly dry
land that has been cleared as a result of the project’s displacement of
the waterline. This deprives waterfront property owners of their
previously existing right to ownership of land up to the “mean high
10
water line” (MHWL). This is exactly what happened to the six
waterfront property owners in Florida’s Walton County, whose land
11
abutted a renourishment project established in the area. The
property owners formed a group called Stop the Beach
12
Renourishment, which became the petitioner in this case.
The project in their area resulted in the creation of additional dry
land between the property owners’ holdings and the ocean—land that
was claimed by the state. The property owners argued that the state’s
acquisition of land inside the MHWL constitutes a taking that
requires compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court ruled against the property
owners, holding that state law did not give them the right to own all
13
property up to the new MHWL created by the project.
The property owners then appealed the decision to the federal
Supreme Court, arguing that the state supreme court decision worked
a taking by upsetting long-established property rights, thereby
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
III. JUDICIAL TAKINGS ARE JUST PLAIN TAKINGS
Judicial takings are ultimately no different from takings carried
out by other government actors. The text and original meaning of the
Constitution provide no basis for distinguishing between the two.

8. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–161.242 (West 2010).
9. Ilya Somin, Does Denying Property Owners Ownership Rights to Land Up to the Water
Line Amount to a “Judicial Taking”? ABA PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., 141 (Nov. 30, 2009)
(summarizing the facts of Stop the Beach Renourishment).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1121 (Fla.
2008), aff'd sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010).
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Neither do Supreme Court precedents applying other parts of the Bill
of Rights. Various efforts to distinguish judicial takings are ultimately
unpersuasive.
A. The Text and Original Meaning of the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment states that “private property” may not be
14
“taken without just compensation.” Nowhere does it distinguish
between takings conducted by the judiciary and those carried out by
any other branch of government. As Justice Scalia puts it in his Stop
the Beach Renourishment opinion,
[t]he Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific
branch or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not
with the governmental actor . . . . There is no textual justification
for saying that the existence or the scope of a State’s power to
expropriate private property without just compensation varies
according to the branch of government effecting the
15
expropriation.

The simple textual solution to the judicial takings quandary is to
assume that whatever action qualifies as a taking if conducted by the
legislature or the executive also does so if done by a state judge. This
approach conforms to the original meaning of the Takings Clause as
understood at the time of the Founding. As Justice Kennedy points
out and Justice Scalia acknowledges, the framers and ratifiers of the
Bill of Rights did not specifically consider the question of judicial
16
takings. But neither did they in any way indicate that judicial action
was to be excluded from the general prohibitory language of the
17
Takings Clause.
Justice Scalia suggests that the Framers did not consider the
problem of judicial takings because they lived in an era when courts
18
were believed to be unable to “change” the common law. Whether or
not this is true, the dominant view during the Founding era was that
private property is a natural right that no government agency has the
19
power to change. James Madison, the principal drafter of the Takings
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
19. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004) (analyzing in detail eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
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Clause, described “the personal right to acquire property” as a
“natural right” that “gives to property, when acquired, a right to
20
protection, as a social right.” In his famous 1792 essay on property,
written the year after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, Madison
emphasized that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of
every sort” and that a government that even “indirectly violates [the
people’s] property” rights cannot be considered “just” and “is not a
21
pattern for the United States.” Obviously, government cannot be
instituted to protect property rights or considered unjust for violating
them if the rights in question were simply its own creations to begin
with. In Madison’s view, and that of most of the Founding generation,
government was required to protect property rights and did not have
22
the power to redefine them at will.
Thus, the original understanding of the Takings Clause did not
assume that property rights were simply the creations of state
governments or that either courts or legislatures had unconstrained
authority to redefine them. From an originalist perspective, Justice
Scalia was too sweeping in his assertion in Stop the Beach
Renourishment that “[t]he Takings Clause only protects property
rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have
23
been established or ought to have been established.”
The textualist and originalist conclusion that judicial takings are
no different from other takings is in line with the Supreme Court’s
treatment of judicial infringements of other rights protected by the
Bill of Rights. For example, in the famous case of New York Times v.
24
Sullivan, the Supreme Court ruled that a state judicial libel judgment
25
violated the First Amendment. The Court rejected the libel plaintiff’s
argument that the First Amendment did not apply to state judicial
decisions in private civil actions, holding that

conceptions of natural property rights and takings); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42–59 (3d. ed.
2008) (examining natural rights views of the founding era); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 103–04, 152–53 (1992)
(discussing the “conventional wisdom” of the Founding era, that property was a natural right).
20. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 29.
21. James Madison, Property, [1792], 515, 517, IN MADISON, WRITINGS (Library of
America, 1999).
22. See generally, NEDELSKY, supra note 19 (discussing that property was a natural right
under the “conventional wisdom” of the Founding era).
23. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
24. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 265.
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[i]t matters not [under the First Amendment] that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only,
though supplemented by statute. . . . The test is not the form in
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
26
whether such power has in fact been exercised.

In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice Scalia cites the case of
27
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, in which the Court concluded
that a state property-law ruling violated the First Amendment rights
28
of protestors. The text of the Fifth Amendment does not distinguish
between courts and legislatures any more than that of the First
Amendment.
B. Possible Rationales for Treating Judicial Takings Differently from
Other Judicial Infringements on Constitutional Rights
Despite the plain text of the Constitution and the parallel
treatment of judicial infringements of other constitutional rights,
some scholars argue that judicial takings should not be forbidden by
29
federal courts. They advance a variety of arguments, including claims
that state courts are, by definition, incapable of committing a taking,
that courts are unlikely to engage in the sorts of “majoritarian” abuses
that the Takings Clause was supposedly enacted in order to prevent,
and that federal intervention against judicial takings requires an
assumption that courts are inevitably “political.” None of these claims
withstands scrutiny.
One of the most influential arguments against the idea of judicial
takings, advanced by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in
Stop the Beach Renourishment, is that courts by definition cannot
commit a taking because they lack the power of eminent domain,
30
which is a legislative function. As Justice Kennedy puts it, “[w]hen

26. Id.
27. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
28. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74
(1980)).
29. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is
Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475 (2010) (arguing that the Takings Clause should not apply to
judicial actions); Richard Ruda, Do We Really Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine? 35 VT. L. REV.
451 (2010). For recent defenses of the idea of judicial takings in the wake of Stop the Beach
Renourishment, see also D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, RICHMOND
L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&
context=benjamin_barros; and Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial Takings and Scalia’s
Shifting Sands, 35 VT. L. REV 423 (2010).
30. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

6/21/2011 12:28:07 PM

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS

97

courts act without direction from the executive or legislature, they
may not have the power to eliminate established property rights by
31
judicial decision” and therefore cannot commit a taking. In the
words of one academic defender of Justice Kennedy’s argument, “[i]f
the courts lack the power to ‘take’ within the meaning of the Takings
32
Clause, their decisions obviously cannot give rise to takings claims.”
This argument is flawed for three reasons. First, even if the court’s
action is illegal under state law that does not mean that it cannot also
qualify as a taking under federal constitutional law. There is no reason
why the action of a state court or other state government agency
cannot violate both state law and the federal Constitution
simultaneously. Justice Kennedy appears to assume that a government
action only qualifies as a “taking” if it is permissible under state law.
But nothing in either the text of the Takings Clause or Supreme Court
33
precedent requires that conclusion.
Second, whether a state court has the power to “take” property is
a question of state law, not federal constitutional law. No federal law
prevents state governments from authorizing their courts to take
private property. Thus, a state-court action that amounts to a taking is
not inevitably illegal under state law.
Finally, as Justice Scalia noted, Justice Kennedy’s argument is
premised on the notion that courts lack the power to allocate
34
financial compensation as required for a taking. Compensation,
however, has never been the exclusive remedy for a violation of the
Takings Clause. “Once a court determines that a taking has occurred,
the government retains the whole range of options already
available—amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the
35
invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.”

argument is also defended by Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487–88.
31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614.
32. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487.
33. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005), the Court stated “the
Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”
In context, however, it is clear that the Court was referring merely to whether the Takings
Clause had met the requirements of the federal Constitution, including having a valid “public
use” and meeting the terms of Due Process Clause. See id. (stating that “if a government action
is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement
or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry”). The Court’s main
point was that a federal court’s inquiry into the “propriety” of a taking is separate from inquiry
into compensation.
34. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2607.
35. First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
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A second possible rationale for excluding judicial takings from
federal scrutiny, developed by Professor John Echeverria, is that the
Takings Clause is intended to protect against “majoritarian” abuses of
property owners by elected officials, whereas courts are “generally
anti-majoritarian” institutions whose task is the impartial
36
enforcement of law.
The Supreme Court has famously stated that “[t]he Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
37
whole.” But no Supreme Court decision has ever ruled that takings
claims can only prevail if the government acted out of “majoritarian”
motives. Uncompensated takings, like other violations of
constitutional rights, can also arise out of the machinations of
minority interest groups or mistakes by well-meaning government
officials. Because of widespread voter ignorance, much legislative and
executive activity escapes meaningful majoritarian control by the
38
voters. The fact that a law violating constitutional rights was adopted
by the legislature does not necessarily mean that it was
“majoritarian.” Takings of private property are often undertaken at
39
the behest of small, well-organized interest groups.
The Supreme Court has never sought to determine whether a
taking was motivated by majoritarian pressures, lobbying by
influential minority interest groups, or some combination of the two.
Furthermore, nothing in the text or original meaning of the Takings
Clause requires it to do so. Indeed, the adoption of the Clause was
partially motivated by fear of uncompensated “impressment” of
private property by unaccountable federal officials against the will of
40
the people.

36. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487–90.
37. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
38. See generally Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A
New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287
(2004).
39. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After
Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 190–203 (2007) (discussing this general problem and giving
examples).
40. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
79–80 (1998).

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

6/21/2011 12:28:07 PM

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS

99

Moreover, courts are far from immune to majoritarian influence.
Many states, including Florida, have elected judiciaries and judicial
41
campaigns have become more competitive in recent years. Professor
Echeverria argues that any judicial takings doctrine adopted by the
Court must also apply to federal judges, whom he claims are
“insulat[ed] as much as possible from majoritarian influence” by life
42
tenure. Trends in public opinion, however, still have a substantial
43
impact on federal-court decisions. Courts may be more insulated
from majority public opinion than legislatures. But they are still
significantly influenced by it.
44
In his article for this symposium, Professor William Marshall
worries that recognizing the existence of political influence on state
courts risks giving in to the “legal realist” notion that judging is purely
political, with jurists simply voting their political preferences under
the guise of following legal doctrine. However, acknowledging the
existence of political influence on state courts does not mean that all,
or even most, decisions are political. Acknowledging it merely means
that state courts are not completely free of political influence. One
need not be a thoroughgoing legal realist to believe that political
pressure sometimes influences judges.
Even where political influence is present, it does not necessarily
imply that the affected judges are deliberately subordinating the law
to political considerations. The influence could take the form of a
political coalition appointing or electing judges who are likely to
support its political agenda for purely jurisprudential reasons. The
judges themselves might have a completely sincere belief in the legal
correctness of their decisions. Overall, Professor Marshall is wrong to
assume that recognizing a cause of action for judicial takings
necessarily requires federal judges to conclude that state-court
45
decision-making is infected by politics. Even state judges completely
immune to political influence might engage in judicial takings as a
41. See Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, IN RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J.
Streb ed., 2007) (discussing the increasing influence of politics on judges). See also Echeverria,
supra note 29, at 489 (acknowledging the influence of judicial elections on courts).
42. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 489.
43. For a recent survey of the evidence, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
44. See William P. Marshall, Judicial Takings, Judicial Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of
the Model of the Judge as Political Actor, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2011).
45. Id.
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result of honest intellectual error.
In sum, the “majoritarian” argument against the judicial takings
doctrine errs both in assuming that the Takings Clause only protects
against majoritarian abuses and that courts are insulated from
majoritarian pressures.
A closely related argument is that state courts do not need as
much federal judicial oversight of their takings practices as political
46
officials because of the superior legal expertise of the former. If
judicial professionalism makes judges less likely to “impair federal
constitutional values” than “the other branches,” that suggests that
fewer meritorious takings claims will be brought against judicial
47
action than legislative or executive action. But the fact that a
particular branch of state government is less likely to violate the
Constitution than other branches is no reason to exempt its actions
from federal scrutiny when it does. Moreover, the same argument
would apply with equal force to all other constitutional rights. If state
judges are so professional that federal scrutiny under the Takings
Clause is unnecessary, why should federal courts review state
decisions for possible First Amendment or Fourth Amendment
violations?
Finally, Justice Breyer and at least one academic commentator
suggest that a judicial takings doctrine would undermine state courts’
48
power to determine state property law. The obvious answer to this
argument is that state legislatures also have sovereign authority over
state property law. Indeed, their power overrides that of state courts
except in cases where a legislative enactment violates the state
constitution. Yet no one argues on this basis that state legislative
enactments on property law should be free of judicial review for
possible Takings Clause violations.
IV. POTENTIAL PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
Even if a judicial takings doctrine is sound in principle, its
implementation could lead to serious practical difficulties. Both
46. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 492.
47. Id.
48. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(expressing fear that a judicial takings doctrine would require federal judges to “play a major
role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property law”); Norman Siegel,
Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461–62 (2010)
(arguing that a judicial takings doctrine would undermine state-court power to shape property
law).
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50

academic critics and Justice Breyer have raised several objections
along these lines. Their most important concerns are federal judges’
lack of expertise on state legal doctrines and the danger of opening
the floodgates to numerous lawsuits challenging routine judicial
rulings. Both fears, however, are greatly overstated.
A. The Problem of Expertise
In his concurring opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice
Breyer worries that a judicial takings doctrine would require
“constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of, state-law
51
cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges.”
Academic critics of Justice Scalia’s position have made similar
52
claims. The supposedly superior property-law expertise of state
courts and other state officials is a standard argument deployed
against federal judicial enforcement of constitutional property rights
53
54
generally. Elsewhere, I have responded to it in greater detail. Here,
I address only those aspects of it that relate to judicial takings.
There are two major problems with the expertise argument
against the judicial takings doctrine. First, if taken seriously, the
expertise argument applies to many other areas of constitutional law
as well. In almost every area of constitutional law where litigants
challenge the constitutionality of state laws, federal courts must
determine what the state law means before deciding whether it
violates the federal constitution. Federal judges also routinely
consider the meaning of state law in diversity cases, where parties
litigating cases under state law choose to do so in federal court

49. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461.
50. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2619.
52. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461 (noting that state courts “have a special ability to
develop rules of property grounded in the individual State's unique history and physical
landscape” and that this is an area of law with which federal judges are generally unfamiliar);
Stacy L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2011).
53. See, e.g., Roderick Hills, Jr., How Federalism Inevitably Trumps Taking Doctrine—And
a Good Thing Too, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 18, 2010), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2010/06/how-federalism-inevitably-trumps-takings-doctrine-1.html (arguing that the greater
expertise of state judges over the details of state property law should obviate the need for
federal oversight); US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Thomas A. Merrill,
Testimony in The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, at
5 (Sept 20, 2005), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=1612
&wit_id=4661.
54. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2011).
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55

because they are citizens of different states.
Second, many areas of constitutional law require federal courts to
analyze local conditions on which state officials and state judges are
likely to have superior knowledge. For example, Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases depend on judgments of “reasonableness,” in
56
which local conditions play a crucial role. The Supreme Court
acknowledges that the reasonableness of a search often depends on
“the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and
events of the community,” about which local judges and “law
57
enforcement officers” may have specialized “expertise.” Yet that
does not mean that federal judges must simply defer to state judges’
assessments of Fourth Amendment claims. Similar local expertise
issues arise with other areas of federal constitutional law, including
58
freedom of speech and Establishment Clause claims.
Assessing state property law might well be an easier task for
federal judges than understanding other variations in state law and
local conditions. There is considerable standardization of basic
property law across state and local lines. For example, nearly all
common-law jurisdictions divide property into a few basic types of
59
estates with standardized packages of rights. Standardization is also
promoted by the influence of the Restatement of Property Law and
60
various treatises.
A variation on the expertise argument is that state judges are
better qualified to assess whether a taking has occurred by unduly
changing state law than federal judges are, due to the superior
61
knowledge of state property law of the former. The possibly superior
expertise of state judges on state law, however, is counterbalanced by
the superior expertise of federal judges with respect to federal

55. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2005) (authorizing diversity jurisdiction lawsuits).
56. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 54.
57. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); see also United States v. Brown, 310
F. App’x 776, 778 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting relevance of “understanding local conditions” in
determining whether a search is reasonable); United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 847 (6th
Cir. 2007) (claiming that local courts have an institutional advantage in ascertaining a search’s
reasonableness because they better understand local conditions).
58. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 54, at 28–33.
59. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry M. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2000) (discussing the
standardization of property rights across common-law jurisdictions).
60. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 41 (1997).
61. See Dogan & Young, supra note 52.
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constitutional law. As with any constitutional claim challenging the
validity of a state government action, judges will have to interpret
both the relevant state law and the federal constitutional law that
applies to the situation.
Moreover, in practice, most state judges are not property-law
experts. It is not clear that a state judge without special expertise in
property law will have significantly greater knowledge than a federal
judge from the same geographic region. Federal district judges, for
example, generally hail from the states where they sit, and often
practiced in those states before their appointment to the federal
62
bench. Senators also seek to ensure that their states are well63
represented on the courts of appeals. There is thus no reason to
believe that federal judges sitting in a given state are likely to be less
expert on relevant property law than state judges in the same area.
B. Opening the Lawsuit Floodgates?
The second major practical objection to a judicial takings doctrine
is the fear that it would open the floodgates for numerous lawsuits
against routine state judicial decisions. As Justice Breyer puts it, a
judicial takings doctrine
would invite a host of federal takings claims . . . . Property owners
litigate many thousands of cases involving state property law in
state courts each year . . . . Losing parties in many state-court cases
may well believe that erroneous judicial decisions have deprived
them of property rights they previously held and may
64
consequently bring federal takings claims.
65

Others have raised the same concern.
Such claims are, at best, exaggerated. Property owners are only
likely to file judicial takings cases in federal court if they believe that
they have a strong enough case to justify the cost of litigation. It
seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will adopt a judicial
takings test that gives property owners greater protection than its
current regulatory takings doctrine for legislative and administrative
62. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 87–116 (1996) (discussing “home-state recruitment” of district judges).
63. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 319–23 (1997).
64. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461–62 (arguing that “the doctrine would encourage
dissatisfied litigants to argue that a state court has taken property without payment of just
compensation because it has issued a decision that purportedly departs from prior holdings”).
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takings. And the latter is quite deferential. Government actions are
only considered “per se” takings if they involve a permanent physical
66
occupation of property, or if they permanently deprive the owner of
67
“all economically beneficial or productive use” of his property. Even
a temporary but very long-lasting 100% deprivation of all
68
economically valuable use is insufficient.
All other takings claims are assessed under the so-called Penn
Central test, which sets out three factors that must be weighed in
determining whether a regulatory action that does not involve a
physical invasion of property is a taking: “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant,” the “extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations,” and the
69
“character of the government action.”
Courts generally apply the Penn Central test in ways that favor the
70
government. In 2002, the Supreme Court majority itself indicated
that the Penn Central test had become the “polestar” of its regulatory
takings jurisprudence in large part because it shielded from
invalidation “numerous practices that have long been considered
71
permissible exercises of the police power.” A 2003 study of 133 cases
decided under the test found that property owners prevailed less than
72
10% of the time.
66. Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
67. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
68. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(discussing the severe negative implications of Tahoe-Sierra for regulatory takings claims); Ilya
Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously? The Supreme Court and the “Poor Relation” of
Constitutional Law, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper 08-53, 17–19 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247854. For related criticisms of Tahoe-Sierra, see, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows of Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case,
2002 CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 5 (2002). See also Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private
Property in the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 214–15 (2004) (concluding that the case
essentially “limited Lucas to its facts”).
69. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property
Theory, 30 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 339, 340–344 (2006) (arguing that the majority of the Court’s
justices apply the Penn Central test in a way that is generally deferential to the government and
noting that the “conventional wisdom” among “land-use lawyers” interprets the Court’s
application of the test that way); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed,
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 333 (2007) (noting that property owners rarely prevail in the Supreme
Court under the Penn Central test).
71. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 n.23
(2002) (quotation omitted).
72. F. Patrick Hubbard, et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENV. L. &
POL’Y F. 121, 141–42 (2003). The owners won in 9.8% of cases overall and 13.4% of cases that
reached the merits stage. Id. The authors claim that the 13% success rate is not especially low
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment implies
that the test for judicial takings might be less deferential than Penn
Central; he notes that a judicial taking occurs if a state court
concludes that “an established right of private property no longer
73
exists.” Professor John Echeverria claims that this means that Justice
Scalia “believes that a judicial taking occurs whenever a court ruling
74
changes an ‘established’ rule of property law.” In the same
paragraph, however, Justice Scalia writes that “[c]ondemnation by
eminent domain, for example, is always a taking, while a legislative,
executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be,
75
depending on its nature and extent.” This suggests that judicial
takings claims should be subject to the same standards as legislative
or executive takings claims. Regardless of Justice Scalia’s personal
preferences, it is unlikely that a majority of the Court will agree to
treat judicial takings claims more favorably than other takings. Given
the deferential nature of established regulatory takings jurisprudence,
it is highly unlikely that applying those standards to judicial takings
claims will result in a flood of litigation.
Obviously, more litigation can be expected if the Court were to
adopt stronger rules for regulatory takings claims generally, a position
76
that others and I have advocated. The additional litigation, however,
would be justified if the case for a stronger regulatory takings
jurisprudence is sound. After all, the new litigation would arise only
because the federal courts had under-enforced a constitutional right
for many years, thereby incentivizing state and federal officials to
violate that right on a large scale. Historically, every effort to enforce
constitutional rights after a long period of neglect has stimulated a
77
wave of new litigation. For example, Brown v. Board of Education
when one considers that all but one of the cases where property owners lost were ones where
low litigation costs or high potential rewards justified pursuing a case with a low probability of
success. Id. However, the fact that nearly all of the Penn Central cases litigated in the authors’
sample involved cases where plaintiffs had incentives to go forward with even a low probability
of success merely underscores the fact that the test is tilted against owners. Otherwise, we
should observe a much larger number of cases where plaintiffs went forward despite the fact
that they needed a substantial chance of winning in order to make the costs of litigation
worthwhile.
73. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
74. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 476 (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at
2602).
75. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added).
76. See Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously, supra note 68, at 25–38. For the bestknown work advocating a much stronger regulatory takings standard, see RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
77. 347 U.S. 54 (1954).
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led to a significant increase in race discrimination claims filed against
state governments. Whether the benefits of the new litigation are
worth the costs depends on whether state governments really have
violated the constitutional right in question on a large scale. If the
answer is yes, then the wave of lawsuits is an indication of the scale of
the violations and the degree of federal intervention needed to curb
them. Should the Supreme Court have decided Brown the other way
in order to avoid the resulting increase in litigation?
In the long term, of course, government officials likely will adjust
their policies in response to newly strengthened judicial enforcement
of rights, thereby reducing the flow of litigation. Moreover, as the new
rules become better established and understood, litigants will be able
to predict the likely outcome of takings claims and settle out of court.
In this article, I do not try to make the case for a stronger
regulatory takings jurisprudence. I only suggest that any such case
would not be undermined by the need to enforce the Takings Clause
against courts as well as other government actors.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial takings are fundamentally similar to other takings. The
fact that judges, rather than legislators or executive branch officials,
enact them is irrelevant under the Constitution. No one doubts that
judges are forbidden to violate other constitutional rights. Property
rights protected by the Takings Clause are no different.
Although the definition and enforcement of a judicial takings
doctrine poses genuine challenges, these difficulties are fundamentally
similar to those presented by other takings claims. There is room for
wide-ranging disagreement over such issues as what kinds of
government actions qualify as takings and how much compensation is
78
owed to property owners in the event a taking occurs. But the
answers to such questions should not turn on whether the case
involves a judge or some other agent of the state.

78. See generally Glenn S. Lunney, Compensation for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993) (describing various alternative methodologies for determining
compensation).

